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This is a holdover proceeding based upon Respondent's alleged objectionable conduct in
[*2]allowing loud screaming, yelling and amplified music to emanate from his apartment in a
Statesupervised cooperative building subject to Article II of the Private Housing Finance
Law ("MitchellLama"). Prior to commencing this proceeding Petitioner served on
Respondent first a Notice to Cure, dated October 26, 2020, and then a Notice of Termination,
dated March 16, 2021, as follows:
• The Notice to Cure, dated October 26, 2020, advises Respondent he is in
violation of Rule 15 of his Cooperative Occupancy Agreement's Rules and
Regulations, which prohibits "disturbing noises" and other conduct that interferes
with "the rights, comforts and convenience" of others. The Notice describes an
incident of "loud screaming and yelling" on one date in March 2018 and five
incidents of "loud, amplified music" on specified dates at specified times in
August and September 2020, "all of which substantially affected the comfort of at
least one of your neighbors." The Notice asserts that, "Community complaints
were issued by the Coop City Department of Public Safety." Article Fifth,
Subsection 7(a) of the Occupancy Agreement and State regulation 9 NYCRR §
17275.3(b)(1) are cited as authority for the Notice, which warns Respondent he
must cure "the violations of your Occupancy Agreement and the conduct which
constitutes a nuisance" within ten days (no later than November 12, 2020), or
Petitioner would commence summary holdover proceedings to recover the
apartment pursuant to 9 NYCRR §§ 17275.3(a)(1) and 17275.3(b)(2).
• The Notice of Termination asserts that the grounds for terminating the tenancy
are that Respondent failed to comply with the Notice to Cure, a copy of which is
annexed and incorporated by reference, in that "loud, amplified and disturbing
music was heard emanating from his apartment on March 9, 2021, and that, "the
landlord deems your conduct and/or the conduct of members of your household, as
described in the said Notice to Cure, to be objectionable." Article Fifth, Subsection
7(a) of the Occupancy Agreement and State regulations 9 NYCRR §§ 17275.3(a)

(3) and 17275.3(b)(2) are cited as authority for the Notice.
Respondent, by counsel, moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim under CPLR R
3211(a)(7), arguing that the predicate notices are equivocal and ambiguous and fail to state
good cause for eviction, thereby giving inadequate notice as required by RPAPL § 741(4) and
constitutional due process. Respondent points to inconsistent citations of State rules and
regulations in the two notices: The Notice to Cure cites to the regulation establishing
nuisance as grounds for eviction, 9 NYCRR § 17275(a)(1), and the Notice of Termination
cites to the regulation establishing unauthorized harboring of an animal as grounds for
eviction, 9 NYCRR § 17275(a)(3). Respondent also argues that the predicate notices allege
facts supporting a claim of lease violation as grounds for eviction, yet do not cite to the
relevant regulation, 9 NYCRR § 17275(a)(2). Further, Respondent argues that the notices
lack the requisite specificity to sustain a holdover based on nuisance allegations: Respondent
characterizes the phrase "loud, amplified music was heard" as "boilerplate" and points out
that Petitioner did not indicate how many neighbors complained and did not attach copies of
the "community complaints" issued by the Department of Safety or provide the complaint
numbers. Finally, Respondent argues that insufficient details were provided regarding the one
postcure period incident of noise alleged in the Notice of Termination.
Petitioner opposes the motion, arguing that the predicate notices are sufficient under the
[*3]applicable legal standards and that the reference in the Notice of Termination to the
regulation relating to the harboring of animals as grounds for eviction was a scrivener's error
that should not be regarded as a fatal defect.

STATE REGULATIONS
The regulations applicable to Stateassisted buildings subject to Articles II and IV of the
Private Housing Finance Law are found in Title 9, Subtitle S, Chapter IV, Subchapter C of
the New York Code of Rules and Regulations (NYCRR). Part 1727 covers "Occupancy", and
Subpart 17275 covers "Termination of Tenancy". Section 17275.3(a), entitled "Grounds",
lists fourteen grounds for a "housing company" to obtain possession from a "tenant,
cooperator or other individual". Relevant herein are the following grounds:
• 17275.3(a)(1): "Tenant, cooperator, or other individual commits or permits a
nuisance in the apartment."
• 17275.3(a)(2): "Tenant, cooperator, or other individual violates a substantial

agreement, covenant or obligation of the lease, or fails to comply with any
substantial provision of the bylaws, subscription agreement or other governing
document."
• 17275.3(a)(3): "Tenant, cooperator, or other individual harbors a dog, cat or
other animal in the apartment in violation of the bylaws, subscription agreement,
or other governing document."
Section 17275.3(b), entitled "Procedure", establishes the requirements for a (1) "Notice
to Cure" and (2) "Notice of Termination". A "housing company" must serve a written tenday
Notice to Cure when eviction is sought on any of a specified list of grounds under § 1727
5.3(a), including nuisance (a)(1) and lease violation (a)(2). Notices of Termination are
required for all grounds and must conform to specified procedures.

DISCUSSION
On a motion to dismiss under CPLR R 3211 the court must afford a liberal construction
to the pleading, Leon v Martinez (84 NY2d 83, 8788, 638 NE2d 511, 513, 614 NYS2d 972,
974 [1984]), and "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the
benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged
fit within any cognizable legal theory." Id. "Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its
allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss." EBC I, Inc v
Goldman Sachs & Co (5 NY3d 11, 19, 832 NE2d 26, 31, 799 NYS2d 170, 175 [2005]); TIAA
Global Invs, LLC v One Astoria Sq LLC (127 AD3d 75, 85, 7 NYS3d 1 [1st Dep't 2015]).
For tenancies such as the one at issue herein that are subject to Article II of the New
York State Private Housing Finance Law, a predicate Notice of Termination is required in all
cases; a predicate Notice to Cure is required in a specified subset of those cases. Where a
predicate notice is a required condition precedent to a holdover proceeding, it must meet the
applicable standards of sufficiency; if not, the proceeding must be dismissed for failure to
state a claim under CPLR R 3211(a)(7) as predicate notices are not amendable. Chinatown
Apts Inc v Chu Cho Lam (51 NY2d 786, 412 NE2d 1312, 433 NYS2d 86 [1980]).
Under 9 NYCRR § 17275.3(b)(1), when a Notice to Cure is required it must be one
"setting forth with specificity the violation alleged and stating that the violation must be
cured within 10 days or eviction proceedings may be commenced." Under 9 NYCRR § 1727
5.3(b)(2), every Notice of Termination must state "the ground for eviction, the facts
supporting such ground, and the date for surrender of possession." Further, New York State

courts evaluate the sufficiency of predicate notices based on a standard of reasonableness "in
view of all attendant circumstances". Oxford Towers Co, LLC v Leites (41 AD3d 144, 837
NYS2d 131 [1st Dep't 2007]); Avon Bard Co. v Aquarian Found (260 AD2d 207, 210, 688
NYS2d 514, 517 [1st Dep't], app dism'd, 93 NY2d 998, 717 NE2d 1080, 695 NYS2d 743
[1999]); Hughes v Lenox Hill Hospital (226 AD2d 4, 17, 651 NYS2d 418, 427 [1st Dep't
1996], app dism'd, 90 NY2d 829, 683 NE2d 17, 660 NYS2d 552 [1997]). The notice must
"provide the necessary additional information to enable the tenant respondent to frame a
defense to meet the tests of reasonableness and due process." Jewish Theological Seminary of
America v Fitzer (258 AD2d 337, 338, 685 NYS2d 215 [1st Dep't 1999]). A predicate notice
"need not lay bare a landlord's trial proof" and will be upheld where it is sufficient as a whole
to advise the tenant of the claim. McGoldrick v DeCruz (195 Misc 2d 414, 758 NYS2d 756
[AT 1st Dep't 2003]).
Here, both of Petitioner's required predicate notices — to cure the objectionable conduct
and to terminate the tenancy — comply with the State regulations and are sufficient "in view
of all attendant circumstances", Oxford Towers, supra; Hughes v Lenox Hill Hospital, supra,
to allow Respondent to frame a defense. The Notice to Cure clearly warns the tenant that the
objectionable conduct complained of is excessive noise emanating from his apartment. Six
dates are provided, including specified times on five of those dates. The Notice of
Termination clearly advises the tenant that the grounds for termination of his Cooperative
Occupancy Agreement is his failure to comply with the Notice to Cure, a copy of which, with
proof of service, is attached and incorporated by reference.
Contrary to Respondent's arguments, the Notice to Cure was not rendered deficient
because it does not indicate how many neighbors complained, include copies of the
Department of Safety's "community complaints" or provide complaint numbers. Such
information, along with additional details about the postcure period incident cited in the
Notice of Termination, can readily be acquired by Respondent through either a demand for a
bill of particulars or discovery. McGoldrick v DeCruz (195 Misc 2d 414, 415, 758 NYS2d
756, 757 [AT 1st Dep't 2003]). The phrase "loud, amplified music was heard" is sufficiently
specific to describe the conduct complained and is not merely "boilerplate".
That the Notice to Cure cites to the regulation providing nuisance as grounds for
eviction, 9 NYCRR § 17275(a)(1), and not to the regulation providing lease violation as
grounds for eviction, 9 NYCRR § 17275(a)(2), where the factual allegations of
objectionable noise can support either or both grounds, is of no moment. The parties to a civil
dispute are free to chart their own litigation course, Mitchell v New York Hospital (61 NY2d

208, 214, 461 NE2d 285, 288, 473 NYS2d 148, 151 [1984]); Kass v Kass (235 AD2d 150,
162, 663 NYS2d 581, 590 [2nd Dep't 1997]); Mill Rock Plaza Assocs v Lively (224 AD2d
301, 638 NYS2d 34, 3435 [1st Dep't 1996]); Trump v Trump (179 AD2d 201, 204, 582
NYS2d 1008, 1009 [1st Dep't 1992]); Riveredge Apt Co v Rosenfeld (2003 NY Misc LEXIS
470, 2003 NY Slip Op 50814[U] [AT 1st Dep't 2003]), and the course Petitioner has chosen
here is to proceed on a nuisance theory. The question of whether Petitioner can succeed on
this theory is not before the Court on Respondent's motion to dismiss but rather is an issue
for a later day. See, generally, Sharp v Norwood (223 AD2d 6, 643 NYS2d 39 [1st Dep't
1996], aff'd, 9 NY2d 1068, 659 NYS2d 834, 681 NE2d 1280 [1997]).
It should be noted that, unlike under Rent Stabilization, where a fundamental distinction
between the eviction grounds of lease violation and nuisance is that a predicate notice to cure
is required for the former but not the latter, see Rent Stabilization Code §§ 2524.3(a) and (b),
in MitchellLama housing a [*4]predicate notice to cure is required for both grounds, see 9
NYCRR §§ 17275.3(a)(1), (a)(2) and (b)(1), and Petitioner did comply with this
requirement.[FN1]
As for the citation in the last paragraph of the Notice of Termination to the State
regulation establishing improper harboring of "a dog, cat or other animal" as grounds for
eviction, this is clearly a mistake which, "in view of all attendant circumstances", Oxford
Towers Co, LLC v Leites (41 AD3d 144, 837 NYS2d 131 [1st Dep't 2007]), does not warrant
dismissal. The Notice of Termination states in its second paragraph that the grounds for
terminating the tenancy are "that you have failed to comply with a Notice to Cure", a copy of
which is attached to and incorporated by reference. The Notice to Cure does not cite to the
"dog, cat or other animal" regulation and neither notice contains any factual allegations
mentioning any animals.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Respondent's motion is denied. The case is calendared in
Resolution Part C for April 12, 2022 at 10:00 a.m. with the following briefing schedule for
any further motion practice: March 25, 2022 for motion to be filed on NYSCEF; April 8,
2022 for opposition and/or crossmotion; April 12, 2022 for reply/opposition to cross
motion. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court, which is being uploaded on
NYSCEF.

Diane E. Lutwak, HCJ
Dated: Bronx, New York
March 8, 2022
Footnotes

Footnote 1: Whether a post-judgment opportunity to cure is available in a case based on a
theory of nuisance is a separate question. Cabrini Terrace Joint Terrace v O'Brien (18 Misc
3d l 145[A], 859 NYS2d 893 [Civ Ct NY Co 2008]).
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